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 1 Introduction
Recently, in the wake of corporate scandals like Enron, the reform of internal
governancemechanisms hasbeen ahighlydebated issue. In particular,thestruc-
ture of board of directors has been under scrutiny and several reform projects
have been proposed. Despite the debate, the theoretical literature on boards of
directors is still very limited1. Furthermore, the few theoretical models of how
board of directors function are implicitly cast in a dispersed ownership setting
where no shareholder has any incentive to monitor the CEO. However, recent
studies on corporate governance systems in both rich and developing countries
have suggested that the presence of a large shareholder active in …rm’s manage-
mentismuch more common than previouslythought. Contrary towhathappens
in public companies with dispersed ownership, in companies where ownership is
concentrated there is an ”excessive” involvement of owners in the management
of the …rm rather than lack of monitoring.
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) show that interference in the project
selection by a large shareholder reduces managerial discretion and prevents the
manager from appropriating private bene…ts. However, this may also prevent
the manager from making …rm-speci…c investment. For example, the manager
can exert e¤ort to select a new investment project. In this case, the large
shareholder’s right to reverse the manager’s decision and in general to interfere
with his initiative, can destroy the manager’s incentive to take initiative and
to make uncontractible investments. An appropriate ownership structure can
alleviate this problem because, by decreasing her own stake in the …rm, the
largeshareholderdecreases herincentivetointerferewith themanager’s decision
and this, in turn, can restore the manager’s incentive to make …rm-speci…c
investment2. Note however that this decreases also large shareholder’s incentive
1See for example the survey by Hermalin and Weisbach (2001)
2Another theoretical paper that deals with the advantages of manager’s discretion in
project selection is Inderst and Muller (1999). They show that managerial discretion can
alleviate the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders because the manager may
avoid the excessive risk taking in project selection that characterize shareholders’ behavior
when a project is …nanced by debt. Then, as in the previous paper, ownership structure can
be a useful commitment device to leave the manager with discretion in project choice.
2to monitor the manager3.
The present paper is a …rst attempt to provide a model that analyzes the
optimal structure of board of directors with a controlling shareholder actively
involved in corporate governance. It focuses on the choice between one-tier and
two-tier structure in a setting where the board performs two tasks: informa-
tion gathering to select an investment project, and monitoring. It investigates
how the separation of the two tasks provided by a two-tier board can alleviate
the problem of large shareholder’s interference underlined by Burkart, Gromb
and Panunzi. In particular, it shows that, a two-tier structure can restore the
manager’s incentive to exert e¤ort and get informed without reducing the large
shareholder’s incentive to monitorthe manager. Tothis end the papercompares
a one-tier structure where all tasks are performed by the sole board controlled
by the large shareholder, with a two-tier structure where some tasks are allo-
cated to the management board and other tasks to the supervisory board. In
a one-tier board, project selection is discussed in board’s meeting and the large
shareholder can impose the project she prefers. After the projectis selected, the
board/large shareholder also performs its monitoring task and decides whether
to replace the manager or not. In a two-tier board, the management board
chooses the project and the supervisory board has the task to monitor the man-
ager. We focus on the case in which large shareholder controls the supervisory
board but not the management board. The two boards act independently and
their behavior re‡ect the di¤erent objectives of their members.
The main …nding of the paper is that the manager exerts a higher level of
e¤ortin the dual board casewhere he can choosetheinvestment project without
interference by the large shareholder. This in turn, leads to higher expected
pro…ts in a two-tier structure. The di¤erence in pro…ts can be su¢ciently high
to induce the large shareholder to prefer a two-tier board despite the fact that
3The negative e¤ects induced by ”excessive control” are documented in an experiment
conducted by Falck and Kosfeld (2004) who analyze the interaction of motivation and control
in a principal-agent setting where the principal decides whether to leave a choice to the
agent’s discretion or to limit the agent’s choice set. They show that ”the decision to control
signi…cantly reduces the agent’s willingness to act in the interest of the principal. Explicit
incentives back…re and performance is lower if the principal controls compared to if he trusts”
(Falck and Kosfeld 2004, page 1).
3in this case the manager chooses his preferred project rather than the project
preferred by the large shareholder.
Thus, the paper suggests that a two-tier structure of board can be a useful
commitment device that enables the large shareholder to restrain from interfer-
ingwith manager’s choiceand therefore it may bea valuableoption in Continen-
tal Europe where …rms’ ownership (including large corporation) is concentrated
and founding families may be "too active" in …rm management.
The small theoretical literature on board of directors has focused mainly on
CEO monitoringby board of directors. In these papers theability of the CEO is
unknown and the board is in charge of assessing the quality of the CEO in order
to decide whether to retain or dismiss him. Monitoring is regarded as the most
important taskperformed bytheboard. Seefor exampleHermalinand Weisbach
(1998), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998), and Warther (1998). A broader view on
the tasks of boards of directors is taken in Graziano and Luporini (2003) where
the board has two tasks: …rst CEO selection and then CEO dismissal/retention
decision.
Finally, two recent papers have analyzed the interplay of board structure
and information transmission within its members. Information sharing is cen-
tral to the model by Harris and Raviv (2005) where board directors are both
monitors and suppliers of expertise. Because of the agency problems neither
outside directors nor insiders communicate fully their information. The authors
characterize when it is optimal to have insiders in control of the board and
when it is optimal to have outsiders controlling it. Furthermore, they deter-
mine the optimal number of directors from the tradeo¤ between the increase
in the overall expertise provided as the number of directors increases and the
reduced incentive for each director to spend e¤ort to become informed.
Closest toour paper is the model by Adams and Ferreira(2003)who consider
the advisory role of the board as important as the monitoring role and focus on
thetradeo¤ between these twotasks. On the one hand, if the manager shareshis
information with the board he can get better advises from the directors. On the
4other hand, the information provided by the manager may increase therisk that
he will be …red. The authors compare the sole with the dual board structure,
focusing on information sharing between the CEO and the board. Although the
…rst best solution consists of a sole board, they conclude that in some cases it is
better tochoose adual board so as to separatethe advisory from themonitoring
role. In a sole board in fact the CEO may restrain from sharing his information
because it can be used to better control him. Then, their model suggests that a
two-tier board structure may provide the correct incentive to share information
and it illustrates cases where a two-tier board may be superior to a one-tier
structure. Despite the similarities our paper di¤ers from their in one crucial
aspect: what drives our result is not the incentive to share information in the
dual board case but the di¤erent roles played by the large shareholder in the
two board structures. A central element in our model, absent in Adams and
Ferreira’s, is the concentration of …rm’s ownership and theresulting interference
by the large shareholder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
framework. The choice of monitoring intensity by the large shareholder is ana-
lyzed in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 illustrate the choice of e¤ort by manager and
board/large shareholder in a one-tier and in a two-tier structure, respectively.
Section 6 compares the two board structures and presents the main results of
the paper. Finally, Section 7 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider a …rm run by a risk neutral manager who operates under advice and
supervision of the board of directors. Ownership is concentrated in the hands of
a large shareholder who holds a fraction ﬁ of shares and sits in the board. The
remaining (1¡ﬁ) of shares are dispersed among small investors not represented
on the board. The board has a dual role. First, it gives advice and supports
the manager in making investment decisions and, more importantly, it approves
the choice of investment projects. Then, once a project has been undertaken, it
5supervises the behavior of the manager and decides whether to retain or dismiss
him. We assume that there are two types of manager: high (H) and low (L)
ability. Manager’s ability is unknown to the board/large shareholder. However,
as we explain below, the large shareholder can engage in monitoring to …nd out
whether the ability of the manager is high or low.
Project Choice
Following Burkart et al. (1997) we assume that the …rm faces N investment
projects, but only threeof them arerelevant. The other N¡3 projects (indexed
from 4 to N) yield negative return and negative bene…ts. Neither the manager
nor the large shareholder wants to undertake them.
Project 1 is a safe project, whose return is known and normalized to zero.
It does not give any private bene…t, neither to the large shareholder nor to the
manager.
Expected monetary return for project 2 and 3are positive and dependent on
manager’s ability. Both projects aresuccessful with probability p if the manager
ishigh ability and with probabilityq ifthemanageris low ability,with p > q > 0.
The two projects yield pro…ts e … = … when successful, and they yield zero pro…ts
( e … = 0) when unsuccessful. This assumption is equivalenttosay thatpro…ts are
a random variable whose realization can be positive or equal to zero depending
on the (unknown) ability of the manager and on an unobservable component.
When such component takes very low (high) realizations, pro…ts are equal to
zero (to …), no matter the ability of the manager. For intermediate realizations
of the state of nature, the manager makes the di¤erence.
Manager’s type a¤ects …rm’s pro…ts also in the long run. Since our model
is not dynamic, we capture this feature by introducing second period pro…ts
and by assuming that these pro…ts are the discounted value of future expected
pro…ts. Second period pro…ts are … if the manager is high-ability and … if the
manager is low-ability, with … > …. These pro…ts depend only on the ability of
themanager and areindependentof the project’s choice. In other words, overall
pro…tsfrom theprojectunder scrutiny arerepresented by e …;whilesecond-period
6pro…tsrepresentpro…ts thatareexpected from futureprojects undertaken by the
management of the …rm. In order to avoid cases in which future compensations
have such a high weight in the decision problem of the high-ability manager as





The fraction of high ability managers in the population is ‚. Thus, ‚p +
(1 ¡ ‚)q denotes the probability of success in the project, i.e. the expected
probability of obtaining ….
The two projects di¤er in the private bene…ts they yield to the large share-
holder and to the manager4. Project 2 yields private bene…ts b to the manager
and zero to the large shareholder. Project 3, on the contrary, is the project
preferred by the large shareholder: it yields her private bene…ts B and zero to
the manager. Private bene…ts are obtained in all states of nature, even in case
of zero pro…ts. For example, the bene…t may be the possibility of hiring a friend
or relative, and this does not directly depend on the level of realized pro…ts.
Summarizing, the overall return of project 2 is … +b in case of success, and it
is 0+ b in case of failure. Similarly, total return from project 3 is … + B if
successful and 0+B otherwise.
Board Structure
As to the structure of the board, we consider two di¤erent cases. First, we
analyze a one-tier structure where both tasks, investment selection and moni-
toring of the manager, are attributed to a sole entity. In the sole board case
the large shareholder controls the board. As a result, she controls both tasks:
project selection and CEO monitoring. Thus, if large shareholder and manager
disagree on the choice of the project, the large shareholder is able to impose her
decision on the manager.
Then, we examine a two-tier structure where the management board deals
with investment decisions and the supervisory board controls the behaviorof the
manager. In the dual board case we assume that the same person cannot sit on
4The possibility to extract private bene…ts has been largely documented in the literature.
For a discussion of the possible ways in which controlling shareholders may expropriate mi-
nority shareholders see for example Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
7both boards and that the large shareholder sits in the supervisory board. The
idea is to analyze how to optimally use the advantage that the large shareholder
has in monitoring the manager. Given that the large shareholder sits only on
the supervisory board, it follows that she does not take part in the investment
decision taken by the management board. We will discuss this assumption and
its possible interpretations in the …nal section.
The management board is composed mainly by managers with executive
functions in the …rm and close to the CEO. Therefore, we focus on a situation
where the preferences of the management board are aligned to those of the
CEO. In particular, we assume that the board can enjoy part of the private
bene…ts b. For example, the CEO can expand the …rm beyond the optimal size
for the personal prestige and power derived from being the CEO of a large …rm.
However, this is a bene…t enjoyed by all members of the management board,
not only by the CEO. The monitoring function is performed by the supervisory
board where the large shareholder has the majority.
Information structure
Except project 1 that is immediately identi…able, all other projects cannot
be distinguish from one another without additional information. The manager
has to become informed to choose the ”good” project. By exerting e¤ort e, he
becomes informed with probability e; at cost e2=2:
Also the large shareholder or the management board can obtain some infor-
mation byexertinge¤ort " atcost"2=2, butin ordertousethisinformation they
need the information gathered by the manager. How the information gathered
by di¤erent persons combine, depends on the structure of the board, because
alternative structures give the manager di¤erent incentives to share his infor-
mation.
Themanager decidesifand how much information tosharewith theboard/large
shareholder on the basis of his personal interest. We model this feature by as-
suming that manager’s and board/large shareholder’s e¤orts combine in the
8following way:
Pr(manager and board are informed) = e(z + ") (1)
where 0 · z · 1 is a parameter under manager’s control. The latter’s incentive
to share information depends on the structure of the board since this in turn
determines whochooses theproject. In the sole board structure, the largeshare-
holder can impose her decision on the manager. Thus, if the large shareholder
is informed, the manager knows that project 3 will be chosen. If instead, the
large shareholder is not informed but the manager is, project 2 will be chosen.
Then, given that project 2 is the favorite project of the manager, in the sole
board case the latter sets the lowest possible value for z; i.e. z = 0 so that he is
informed with probability e while large shareholder is informed with probability
e": In Aghion and Tirole (1997) terminology, the formal and the real authority
to select the project may di¤er because the real authority rests with the person
who is informed. Then, the case in which the manager only is informed can be
regarded as a case in which the large shareholder delegates the choice of the
project to the manager.
In the dual board structure, CEO’s and management board’s objectives are
aligned: they both like project 2. In this case only project1 or 2will be selected.
Since the manager wants to maximize the probability of implementing project
2 he shares his information with the board by setting z = 1. Then, project 2 is
chosen with probability e(1+") and project 1 with complementary probability.
As in the model by Adams and Ferreira (2003), in our model the manager
has an incentive to restrain from sharing his information with the sole board,
but the motivation for this behavior is quite di¤erent. In Adams and Ferreira
the information is used to update the prior on the manager’s type and this in
turn increases the probability that he will be …red. In our model, instead, the
manager does not share his information with the large shareholder to increase
the probability that he (the manager) will be delegated to choose the project.
Furthermore, the di¤erent incentive to share the information provided by the
two board structures is not crucial to our result. As it will be clear in thesequel,
9our main result holds even with z = 0 in the dual board case.
Monitoring
When either project 2 or 3 has been undertaken, a signal s on period-1
pro…ts becomes available to the (supervisory) board and consequently to the
large shareholder. Given the positive correlation between …rst-period pro…ts
and manager’s type the signal allows the large shareholder to revise his prior
on the manager’s ability. Nonetheless, gathering additional information may be
pro…table as it may allow a better retention/…ring decision. Given her stake in
the …rm, the large shareholder has the strongest incentive to engage in moni-
toring and we assume that both in a one-tier and in a two-tier board structure
monitoring is performed only by the large shareholder. The motivation is that
other board members either tend to free ride like the other shareholders who
are assumed to have small fractions of shares, or they may collude with the
manager.
According to the result of such monitoring, the manager can be con…rmed
or …red. A monitoring intensity M allows the shareholder to become informed
on the ability of the manager with probability M at cost M2=2.
If the incumbent is …red and anew manager is hired, the…rm incurs in …ring
costs C. The …ring cost captures the fact that the hiring process is costly and
it may take a while before a new manager is selected. Furthermore, the new
manager needs some time to become fully operational in the new environment.
Weassumethat itis toocostly to changeproject onceits realization hasstarted,
so that even if a new manager is hired he cannot change it. However, the
probability of success in the project depends on the ability of the new manager.
A gain, both in the …rst-period and second period pro…ts, may occur if a low
ability manager is replaced by a high ability one.
Summarizing, the sequence of events is the following:
- a manager is randomly selected from the population of managers;
- the manager learns his ability and, given the board structure, decides how
10much information to share;
- the manager and the board decide e¤ort levels to get informed about
projects;
- given the overall information available, either the manager (in a dual board
structure) or the large shareholder (in a sole board structure) decides which
project to undertake;
- if a risky project is selected the large shareholder observes a signal s on
…rst-period pro…t and then chooses monitoring intensity;
- on the basis of the information obtained through monitoring, the large
shareholder decides whether to …re or retain the manager;
- if the incumbent manager is …red, a new manager is hired. The new
manager cannot change the project but he can a¤ect pro…ts’ realization;
- …rst-period pro…ts and private bene…ts are realized;
- second-period pro…ts are realized.
When making their decisions on the level of e¤ort, both the manager and
the large shareholder anticipate the latter’s subsequent choice of monitoring
intensity. We then proceed by backward induction, examining …rst the large
shareholder’s decision on monitoring and using this result to analyze the choice
of e¤ort levels.
3 The Choice of Monitoring Intensity
After the project is selected, the large shareholder chooses the intensity with
which she wants to monitor the manager. We focus our attention on monitor-
ing when project 2 or 3 are undertaken and, as explained below, we rule out
monitoring when project 1 is selected.
Recall that monitoring is aimed at increasing expected pro…ts while leaving
privatebene…ts una¤ected. Both project2and project3yield thesameexpected
11pro…ts. As aconsequencewecan analyzemonitoring independentlyof thechoice
between such projects.
Before choosing monitoring intensity the large shareholder observes a signal
s on …rst-period pro…ts. The signal provides information on the realization of
project’s return and only indirectly on manager’s ability. However, manager’s
ability is the only determinantof second-period pro…ts. This makes it important
toknow theabilityof themanagerbeforedecidingwhethertoretain ortodismiss
him. For example, if the large shareholder …res the incumbent manager after
observing a bad signal, she might …re a high ability manager who has just been
unlucky. This in turn may prevent her from getting the high second-period
pro…ts that such a manager would have earned. Then, the large shareholder
may …nd it convenient to engage in monitoring to …nd out the ability of the
manager.
We assume that the signal s on …rst-period pro…ts is perfectly informative,
so that its probabilities are equal to the true probabilities of the return from
the project: the signal is s = … with probability p if the manager is high
ability, and with probability q if the manager is low ability, and it is s = 0 with
complementary probabilities.
After observing s, the large shareholder revises her prior on the ability of the
manager. If s = … the probability that the incumbent manager is good becomes
Pr(I = Hjs = … ) > ‚; if s = 0 it becomes Pr(I = Hjs = 0) < ‚: This implies
that, unless the large shareholder obtains some additional piece of information
speaking in favour of a bad quality of the manager, she will never …re the
CEO after s = …. Besides being the large shareholder’s prior, ‚ represents the
probability that a new manager is high ability, Pr(R = H). Hence the revised
probability that the incumbent manager is good after s = … is higher than the
probability of picking a good manager in case of replacement. When s = 0 on
the contrary, in the absence of additional information the behavior of the large
shareholder depends on the size of the …ring cost C:
We assume that the …ring cost C is su¢ciently small to make it pro…table
12for the large shareholder to replace the manager when s = 0 and no additional
information is received. In this case …rst-period pro…ts under the incumbent
manager arezero whileexpected …rst-period pro…ts arepositiveif the incumbent
is replaced. Recall that zero pro…ts are due either to a very bad state of nature
or to an intermediate state of nature coupled with a bad manager. In the
latter case, …rst-period pro…ts may become … if a bad manager is replaced by
a good one which happens with positive probability. Furthermore, given that
Pr(R = H) = ‚ > Pr(I = Hjs = 0 ); also expected second-period pro…ts
are higher under a replacement than under the incumbent manager. In order
to establish whether the incumbent manager should be …red, such increase in
expected pro…ts should be compared to the …ring cost.
It can be easily veri…ed (see Appendix A (i)) that …ring the manager after
a bad signal is pro…table when C < C where
C = [‚¡ Pr(I = Hjs = 0)](… ¡ …)+ …Pr(…js = 0;R = H)Pr(I = Ljs = 0)‚:
In the following sections we restrict our attention to the case where C · C: In
the absence of additional information on the ability of the manager, the large
shareholder prefers to …re the manager after s = 0.
In order to obtain additional information on the ability of the manager, the
large shareholder may invest in monitoring. Recall that if the large shareholder
chooses to monitor the manager with intensity M, she knows with probability
M whether the manager is good while with probability (1 ¡ M) she is unable
to identify the type of the manager despite monitoring. Monitoring costs M2=2
are entirely borne by the large shareholder.
A positive level of monitoring is always pro…table after a bad signal because,
when successful, monitoringenables to save on …ring costs and avoids the risk of
…ringa high-ability butunlucky manager. If themanageris good, not only there
is no way to increase …rst-period pro…ts by replacing him, but there is also the
risk to replace him with a low-ability manager thereby reducing second-period
pro…ts. If monitoring takes place, the large shareholder’s expected …rst plus
13second-period pro…ts are:
E(¦js = 0;M > 0) ´ ﬁ…Pr(…jR = H;s = 0)Pr(R = H)Pr(I = Ljs = 0)+
ﬁ…f[Pr(I = Hjs = 0) +Pr(I = Ljs = 0)Pr(R = H)]M + Pr(R = H)(1¡ M)g+
ﬁ…fPr(I = Ljs = 0)Pr(R = L)M +Pr(R = L)(1¡M)g¡M2=2 ¡
ﬁC [Pr(I = Ljs = 0)M +(1¡M)]
The …rst term on the RHS is the …rst-period pro…t which is independent of
monitoring. This follows from the fact that … can beobtained only if we happen
to be in an intermediate state of nature and a bad manager is substituted with a
good one. Under our assumption the manager is always …red when monitoring
is unsuccessful. Then, a bad manager will be …red both when monitoring is
unsuccessful and when it is successful. As a result, theprobability that … will be
obtained does not depend on monitoring. The second and third terms represent
expected second-period pro…ts. When monitoring is successful, … is obtained if
the incumbent manager is good and if a bad manager is replaced by a good one.
… is also obtained when monitoring is unsuccessful (implying that the manager
is …red irrespective of his unknown ability) if the replacement is good. … is
realized when the incumbent manager is replaced with a bad CEO. The fourth
term represents monitoring costs. Finally, the last term is the expected …ring
cost.
Given that without monitoring the manager is always …red when the signal
is bad, the large shareholder receives:
E(¦js = 0;M = 0) ´ ﬁ…Pr(…jR = H;s = 0)Pr(R = H)Pr(I = Ljs = 0)+
ﬁ…Pr(R = H)+ﬁ…Pr(R = L) ¡ﬁC
Clearly E(¦js = 0;M > 0) is greater than E(¦;s = 0;M = 0) as long
as Pr(I = Hjs = 0)ﬁ[C +(…¡ …)(1¡ ‚)] > M=2; implying that there always
exist positive levels of monitoring that make such activity pro…table after s = 0.
The optimal level of monitoring M¤ is the level that maximizes expected pro…ts
E(¦js = 0;M > 0): Then, from the …rst order condition, we obtain:
M¤ = Pr(I = Hjs = 0)ﬁ[C + (…¡ …)(1¡‚)] (2)
14Optimal monitoringintensity M¤ ispositivelycorrelated with i)theexpected
cost of …ring a high-ability manager if the decision is based only on the signal
on project’s return (Pr(I = Hjs = 0)C), ii) the large shareholder’s fraction of
shares ﬁ; and iii) the loss in expected second-period pro…ts if a good manager
is replaced by a low ability one.
So far we have focussed on monitoring when either project 2 or project 3 is
selected and a bad signal is observed. However, monitoring may be pro…table
also when project1 is chosen or when, afterselecting project 2or3, the observed
signal is good (s = …). In the …rst case, monitoring could avoid retaining a bad
manager who will earn only … in the second period. In the latter case instead,
monitoring could avoid retaining a low-ability manager that has been lucky. In
the following sections we assume that the …ring cost C is su¢ciently large to
make monitoring in those cases unpro…table. In Appendix A we show that the
threshold level such that monitoring is unpro…table after s = … is the same
as the threshold level that makes monitoring unpro…table when project 1 is
selected. Let b C denote such threshold level. Then, in the following sections we
will focus on the case in which the …ring cost belongs to an intermediate range:
b C < C < C. Our conclusions however would remain unchanged even for values
of C < b C:5
4 The choice of e¤orts in a sole board structure
Letus …rstconsiderthemanager’s choiceofe¤ort in aone-tierstructure. Project
selection is discussed in the board where the large shareholder has the majority
of votes. Thelargeshareholder wantstomaximizeB+ﬁE(¦)whilethemanager
wants to maximize b +–E(¦) where –E(¦) represents the variable component
of his salary, having normalized to zero the …xed component.6 Given that an
informed large shareholder imposes the choice of project 3 on the manager, in a
5Proofs that results of Sections 4 and 5 still hold when b C > C are available from the
authors.
6For simplicity we rule out the possibility that the manager owns shares of the …rm so
that –… is received only if the manager is still employed by the …rm when pro…ts are realized.
Finally, to re‡ect the di¤erent roles played by the large shareholder and by the manager we
assume that – < ﬁ.
15sole board structure there is no information sharing because the manager has no
incentive to cooperate with the large shareholder in processing information, i.e.
the manager sets z = 0. As a consequence the manager becomes informed with
probability e, while the large shareholder is informed with probability e": The
latter represents the probability of project 3 being selected. With probability
e(1¡") only themanageris informed and in this case he can choose his preferred
project, i.e. project 2. Finally, with probability (1 ¡ e) neither the manager
nor the owner is informed and project 1 is chosen yielding zero pro…ts and zero
private bene…ts.
The maximization problem of the manager
When making his decision, the manager knows his own type. Hence, a high
ability manager chooses the optimal level of e¤ort eH¤
S (where subscript s stands
for sole board) taking into account that if project 2 or 3 is selected, he will be




S)[b(p+(1¡p)M¤)+ p–…]+[(1¡e)+ e(p+(1¡ p)M¤)]–…¡e2=2:
In case of interior solution, from the …rst-order condition we obtain:
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Analogously, alow ability manager chooses the optimal level of e¤ort eL¤
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Manager’s e¤ort is negatively correlated with large shareholder’s e¤ort, "¤
S.
This is so because a higher value of "¤
S reduces the probability of implementing
project 2, the preferred project of the manager.
Notice that the e¤ort of the good manager depends (positively) on the level
of monitoring exerted by the large shareholder, while the e¤ort of the bad
manager is independent of M. This happens because, the higher the monitoring
intensity, the higher is the probability that a good manager will be con…rmed,
which in turn increases his incentive to exert e¤ort. The bad manager instead
is always …red when the return of the project is zero, independently of the
outcome of monitoring. In fact he is …red both when the large shareholder is
able to identify his type and when she is not. Finally, observe that manager’s
e¤ort decreases as second-period pro…ts increase. This is so because a high level
of e¤ort implies a high probability of choosing project 2 or 3 which entail the
risk of being …red in the …rst period. If project 1 is chosen, which requires no
e¤ort, the manager is always retained and receives his fraction of second-period
pro…ts.
The maximization problem of the Board/Large Shareholder
Since in the sole board case the large shareholdercontrols the board, we identify
the board with the large shareholder. When making her decision on theoptimal
level of e¤ort "¤
S, the large shareholder does not know the type of the manager.
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S ﬁ…p+ (1¡ ‚)eL¤
S [ﬁ…(q +(1¡q)￿)]
o
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where ￿ = Pr(…jR = H;s = 0)Pr(R = H) is the probability of obtaining …rst-
period pro…ts … when a bad manager is replaced following the observation of
s = 0, while Pr(M = Hjt = 2) and Pr(M = Ljt = 2) represent the probability
that the manager running the …rm at time 2 is high or low ability. Since such
probabilities do not depend on ", we have not speci…ed their expressions.7











The e¤ort levelchosen bythelarge shareholder depends positively on herprivate
bene…tB and on the manager’s e¤orte¤
S. When theprivate bene…ttendstozero
also the large shareholder’s e¤ort to become informed tends to zero since in this
case she is indi¤erent between project 2 and 3. For B positive but smaller than
1, the optimal e¤ort level is smaller than one: "¤
S < 1: Finally, when the private
bene…t is su¢ciently large, the optimal e¤ort becomes equal to one, "¤
S = 1.
Let B denote the size of her private bene…ts such that "¤
S = 1: When the share
of pro…ts of the manager is high enough to induce him to make the highest
possible e¤ort, i.e. e
H¤
S = eL¤
S = 1; also the large shareholder makes the highest
e¤ort provided that her private bene…t is not smaller than 1. Observe that
7It can be easily veri…ed that Pr(M = Hjt = 2) = ‚[(1 ¡ e
H¤
S ) + e
H¤
S (1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡
M¤)(1 ¡ ‚))] +(1 ¡ ‚)e
L¤
S (1 ¡ q)M¤‚ while Pr(M = Ljt = 2) = (1 ¡ ‚)(1 ¡ e
L¤
S ) + ‚e
H¤
S (1 ¡
p)(1 ¡ M¤)(1 ¡ ‚) + (1 ¡ ‚)e
L¤





S = 1; the large shareholder is informed with certainty,
which implies that she will choose her preferred project, i.e. project 3. In
general the large shareholder’s e¤ort is positively correlated with the manager’s
e¤ort because the higher is e¤
S; and the higher is the marginal bene…t of an
increase in "¤
S in terms of an increase in the probability of choosing project 3.
Note that in general the probability of choosing project 3 is higher than that of
choosingproject 2 only if "S > 1=2. Indeed, for low values of B and e¤
S the large
shareholder has no incentive to exert high level of "S because the probability of




Z ´ ‚ZH +(1¡‚)ZL ´ b[‚(p+ (1¡p)M¤)+(1¡‚)q)];
¢H ´ –…p
¢L ´ –…q
¢ ´ ‚¢H +(1¡‚)¢L = –…(‚p+ (1¡ ‚)q)
FH ´ (1¡p)(1¡M¤)–…
FL ´ (1¡ q)–…
F ´ ‚FH +(1¡‚)FL:




B(Z + ¢¡ F)
1+BZ
(6)
Note that if the manager does not receive any share of pro…ts, i.e., – = 0
implying ¢ = F = 0, the optimal e¤ort of large shareholder is smaller than one,
"¤
S = "S < 1: In this case, when her private bene…ts B increase, her e¤ort to
become informed increases as well (@"S=@B > 0) but never reaches 1: At the
same time eH¤
S and eL¤
S asymptotically tend to 0:
19If we substitute back the optimal value of "S in the e¤ort levels chosen by










+ ¢L ¡ FL
Since the way e¤orts change as private bene…ts increase is crucial for our result,
we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Large shareholder’s e¤ort "¤
S is continously increasing in her pri-
vate bene…ts B, ranging from "¤
S = 0 when B = 0 to "¤






. Manager’s e¤ort e¤i
S is continously decreasing in large
shareholder’s private bene…ts from ei
S to ei
S where ei
S = minfZi + ¢i ¡Fi;1g;
while ei
S = minf¢i ¡ Fi;1g, i = H;L:











5 The choice of e¤orts in a dual board structure
Let us now consider a two-tier structure with a management and a supervisory
board. As discussed above we consider the case where the large shareholder
sits on the supervisory board where she has the majority. Recall also that we
assume that the management board is composed mainly by managers close to
the CEO and that they can enjoy part of the manager’s private bene…ts b. In
particular, we assume that the board can enjoy a fraction ﬂ1 of the bene…ts b
and that this does not reduce the private bene…ts of the CEO. In other words
we are considering the bene…ts b as a sort of ”public” good with respect to the
CEO and the members of the management board. Directors care also for the
…nancial return of the project. Their objective function is ﬂ1b + ﬂ2E(¦):
This implies that both the management board and the CEO have the same
preferences among investment projects. If they are informed they will always
choose project 2, otherwise they will choose project 1: As a consequence, the
20value of z in eq. (1) will be set equal to 1, implying that project 2 will be
selected with probability e(1+") while project 1 will be chosen with probability
1¡ e(1+"):
The maximization problem of the manager
A high ability manager chooses the optimal level of e¤ort eH¤
D taking into
account that if project 2 is selected, he will be retained with probability p +
(1¡ p)M¤. He then solves:
max
e e(1+"¤
D)[b(p+ (1¡ p)M¤)+ p–…]+[(1¡ e)+ e(p+ (1¡ p)M¤)]–…¡e2=2:















Analogously, alow ability manager chooses the optimal level of e¤ort eL¤
D taking




D)q[b+ –…]+ [(1¡ e)+ eq]–… ¡ e2=2:
In case of interior solution, from the …rst-order condition we obtain:
eL
D = (1+"¤















Again, the e¤ort of the good manager depends on the monitoring by the large
shareholder, while the e¤ort of the bad manager does not, because the bad
manager is always …red when the return of the project is known to be zero.
21The maximization problem of the Management Board
When making its decision on the optimal level of e¤ort "¤
D, the board does
not know the type of the manager8. Taking into account that a bad manager






+ﬁ…Pr(M = Hjt = 2)+ ﬁ…Pr(M = Ljt = 2)¡
"2
2
In case of an interior solution, the …rst-order condition gives:
"D = ‚e
H
D [ﬂ1b + ﬂ2…p]+ (1¡ ‚)eL
D[ﬂ1b +ﬂ2…(q +(1¡ q)￿)]: (9)
Let GH = ﬂ1b +ﬂ2…p, and GL = ﬂ1b +ﬂ2…(q +(1¡q)￿):Substituting for the






‚GH(ZH +¢H ¡ FH)+ (1¡ ‚)GL(ZL +¢L ¡FL)





Note that if e
H¤
D = eL¤
D = 1; "¤
D = 0 In fact, when the manager is informed with
certainty, there is no reason for the management board to acquire additional
information because of the information sharing. High managerial e¤ort has
opposite e¤ects in the dual and in the sole board structure. In the latter, a
high managerial e¤ort leads to a high e¤ort by the large shareholder who does
not want to let the manager choose the project. In the …rst case instead, where
manager’s and board’s e¤orts are substitutes, high e¤ort bythemanagerinduces
low e¤ort by the management board.
Finally, if we substitute back the value of "D in the expressions for the





1¡ ‚GHFH ¡ (1¡ ‚)GLFL
1¡ ‚GH(ZH + ¢H)¡ (1¡‚)GL(ZL +¢L)
¸
(ZH + ¢H)¡ FH
8In the dual board case it may be reasonable to assume that the management board
knows the type of the CEO. Our main result still holds under this assumption. However,
for symmetry with the sole board case we prefer to maintain that the board doesn’t know






1¡ ‚GH(ZH + ¢H)¡ (1¡ ‚)GL(ZL + ¢L)
¸
(ZL + ¢L)¡FL:
6 One-Tier versus Two-Tier board
We are now in a position to make a comparison between the sole and the dual
board structure. First of all we consider the e¤orts. Comparing (3) with (7);
(4) with (8) and (6) with (10) it immediately follows:
Lemma 2: The level of e¤ort exerted by the manager is higher in a dual board







i = H;L. The level of e¤ort exerted by the management board in a dual board
is higher than that exerted by the large shareholder in the sole board structure
("D > "S) if and only if the large shareholder’s private bene…ts B are lower
than the threshold value e B where e B is de…ned by:
e B ´
"D
¢¡ F + (1¡ "D)Z
The level of e¤ort exerted by the manager is higher in a dual board structure
because the manager, by choosing project 2 when informed, can appropriate
private bene…ts b: As to the e¤ort exerted by the board, we have to consider
the private bene…ts of the owner relatively to the threshold level e B. e B is
lower the lower is M¤ (which implies a lower F and a higher Z) and the lower
are b and ﬂ1(which imply a lower "D): In other terms we have to compare
the private bene…ts of the large shareholder (in the sole board case) with the
gains appropriable by the management board (in the dual board case). Only
if such gains are particularly high, the e¤ort of the management board will be
higher than the e¤ort of the large shareholder, "D > "S. This can be better
understood in the special case in which neither the manager nor the members of
themanagementboard receive any share of pro…ts, i.e. when – = ﬂ2 = 0: In this
case e B = "D
Z(1¡"D) =
ﬂ1b
1¡2ﬂ1b2(‚(p+(1¡p)M¤+(1¡‚)q): Here the positive relationship
between the value of e B and the private bene…t of the management board is
23immediately evident. On the contrary, when the amount of pro…ts appropriable
by the manager is particularly high, e¤
D = 1 implying "D = 0 and "¤
S > "¤
D:
Expected pro…ts are equal to
E(¦S) = eH¤
S ‚p… +eL¤
S (1¡ ‚)[q + (1¡ q)￿]…+
…Pr(M = Hjt = 2)+ …Pr(M = Ljt = 2) (11)






D (1¡‚)[q+ (1¡ q)￿]
ª
+
…Pr(M = Hjt = 2)+ …Pr(M = Ljt = 2) (12)
under the dual board structure. The large shareholder, however, is also inter-
ested in her private bene…ts. As a consequence her preferences between the two
board structures depend on her expected gains rather than on expected pro…ts.
Recalling that she obtains B only when project 3 is undertaken, i.e. with prob-
ability e¤
S"¤














ﬁ…Pr(M = Hjt = 2)+ ﬁ…Pr(M = Ljt = 2) (13)
while under the dual board structure expected gains correspond to the frac-
tion of expected pro…ts the large shareholder obtains:





D (1¡‚)[q +(1¡ q)￿]
ª
+
ﬁ…Pr(M = Hjt = 2)+ ﬁ…Pr(M = Ljt = 2) (14)
Let us now assume for simplicity that the values of ZH; ¢H and FH are such
that the e¤ort of the manager in the sole board structure is always strictly lower
than 1:9 We can then prove the following.
9We assume that ZH + ¢H-FH<1, which implies ZL + ¢L-FL<1. This assumption sim-
24Proposition: Expected pro…ts are higher under the dual board structure. Large
shareholder preferences, however, depend on the size of her private bene…ts. We
can distinguish two cases:
i) – = 0: If E(GD) ¸ 1=2 the large shareholder always prefers the dual
board structure; if instead E(GD) < 1=2 there exists a threshold value b B > 0
such that the large shareholder prefers the dual board structure i¤ B < b B:
ii) – > 0: There exists a threshold value b B > 0such that the large shareholder
prefers the dual board structure if B < b B.
Proof: see Appendix B.
The above proposition shows that, as long as the private bene…ts of the
large shareholder are not ”too large”, the higher e¤ort exerted by manager in
the two-tier board structure may lead the large shareholder to prefer such a
structure to the one-tier board. It indicates that the large shareholder is more
likely to prefer the dual board structure when the manager does not receive any
incentive pay, i.e. – = 0. This is so, because when – = 0 the manager does not
have other incentive to exert e¤ort than the private bene…t he obtains if project
2 is chosen. However, in the sole board structure project 2 is less likely to be
implemented and this in turn implies a smaller managerial e¤ort than in the
dual board case.
In general, we can conclude that for low enough values of the private bene…ts
B, the e¤ect of the higher e¤ort exerted in the dual board case on expected
pro…ts more than compensate the reduction in private bene…ts and the large
shareholder prefers the dual board structure. This also implies that if large
shareholder is given the choice between the two board structure she will choose
pli…es the proof of the Proposition but the result (as well as the line of the proof) would
not change if we allow for eH
S = 1. When eL
S = 1, implying also eH
S = eH
D = eL
D = 1 and
E(GD) = E(GS)0; it might happen that the sole board structure is preferred by the large
shareholder even for low values of B. In the sole board structure the large shareholder can
select her favorite project with positive probability. Since managerial e¤ort is the same under
both structures, this comes with no loss on the side of expected pro…ts. However, the neces-




H = 1 makes this a very peculiar
case.
25the optimal one as long as her private bene…ts are not toot large.
Our model assumed that small shareholders owing the fraction (1 ¡ ﬁ) of
shares are not represented on the board and that they do not enjoy private
bene…ts. The underlying assumption is that small shareholders are interested
in maximizing the value of the …rm that depends on expected pro…ts. Then,
they always prefer the two-tier board structure under which expected pro…ts
are maximized. Hence, the proposition illustrates that if large shareholder’s
private bene…ts are not too large the objectives of large shareholder and small
shareholders are aligned.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown in a very simple setting that, when ownership is concentrated in
the hands of a large shareholder, a two-tier board of directors where the large
shareholder sits on the upper-level board can be a useful device to commit not
to interfere with manager’s initiative. By comparing a two-tier with a one-tier
structure we show that the two-tier board has the advantage to leave initiative
to the lower level board (the management board). As a result, manager’s e¤ort
in gathering information on projects is higher in the two-tier structure and
this in turn leads to higher pro…ts than in the one-tier structure where large
shareholder controls the board.
The higher managerial e¤ort comes with no reduction in shareholder’s mon-
itoring of manager’s ability and no reduction in her fraction of shares. The
"price" to be paid for restoring managerial incentives without interfering with
ownership structure and monitoring intensity is the exclusion of large share-
holder from the management board. Indeed, a crucial assumption for our result
is that in the dual board structure the large shareholder sits on the supervisory
board and that investment project is selected by the management board. This
assumption may look unrealistic in some environments where large shareholders
have a tight control on the …rm. An alternative interpretation where the large
shareholderplaysa bigger role, could be the following: the investmentisselected
26by the large shareholder whilethe management board decides how to implement
it. Private bene…ts result from the implementation of the project. For example,
the project at discussion can be the decision to enter a new market. In this
case, the large shareholder would decide whether to expand …rm’s operations
by entering a new market. Once this decision is taken, the management board
would decide the best way to enter the market: for instance, opening new stores
owned by the …rm, starting a chain of franchisee stores or selling the product
through independent multi-brand stores . In the sole board case instead, the
large shareholder would take both decisions: whether to enter the new market
and how to do it.
The paper has important policy implications since the dual board structure
is quite common in Continental Europe where concentrated ownership is still
the norm. In some countries, as Germany, Austria, Belgium, the dual structure
is mandatory, in other countries as France and Italy companies can choose
between di¤erent board models. Our paper shows that indeed dual boards
may be optimal in these countries given their ownership structure, and it o¤ers
support to some corporatereforms, liketherecentreform in Italy, that, following
the recommendation of the High Level Group of Company Law expert of the
European Commission, has introduced the choice between one-tier and two-tier
board structure (for a discussion of recent European corporate reforms see Hopt
and Leyens (2004)).
An important implication of our result is that the controlling shareholder
can choose the optimal structure of the board even if she has private bene…ts.
The amount of private bene…ts must only not be "too large". This in turn
implies that any policy that restricts the amount of private bene…ts that can
be extracted by the controlling shareholder has a positive e¤ect since it makes
more likely the optimal choice of board structure.
We restricted our attention to the choice between one-tier versus two-tier
boards of directors, but the result of the paper may extend to other possible
organizations of the board that may limit the power and interference of the
large shareholder. The dual board structure represents just an opportunity for
27the large shareholder not to interfere with the management. In the absence of
such a structure, it would be more di¢cult for the large shareholder to credibly
commit not to reverse the project choice made by the management, even if
ex-ante it could be pro…table for her to do so.
Finally, observe that if the large shareholder sits in the supervisory board
and does not interfere with the manager’s decision, there is also an important
e¤ect on the con‡ict of interest between majority and minority shareholders.
Indeed, the large shareholder by restricting her interference in …rm manage-
ment restricts also her ability to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.
Although there may be other instruments to limit the ability to expropriate
minority shareholders, as corporate law or the role of independent directors
(see for example Anderson and Reeb 2003) also a two-tier structure of board of
directors, by separating …rm’s management and control, goes in this direction.
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299 Appendix A
i) Computation of threshold value C:
Let ¦ denote the overall pro…ts of the …rm, i.e., the sum of …rst and second
period pro…ts minus possible …ring costs. In order to …nd the value of C we
have toequate thelevel of expected pro…tswhen the manager is …red after s = 0
to the level of expected pro…ts when he is retained after s = 0:
E(¦js = 0;manager is …red) ´ (15)
ﬁf…Pr(…js = 0;R = H)Pr(I = Ljs = 0)‚ +…‚ +…(1¡‚)¡ Cg =
ﬁf…Pr(I = Hjs = 0) +…Pr(I = Ljs = 0)g
´ E(¦js = 0;manager is retained)]
Since Pr(I = Hjs = 0) < ‚ and Pr(I = Ljs = 0) > (1 ¡ ‚); C is strictly
positive and equal to [‚¡Pr(I = Hjs = 0)](…¡…)+…Pr(…js = 0;R = H)Pr(I =
Ljs = 0)‚.
ii) Computation of threshold value b C:
Suppose that either project 2 or 3 has been chosen and a good signal has
been observed. In order to establish the value of b C; we have to compare the
value of the expected pro…ts of the shareholder with and without monitoring.
A good signal, i.e. s = …; indicates that …rst-period pro…ts are high under
the incumbent manager. Considering that monitoring could only result in a
bad manager being substituted, the decision on monitoring will depend only on
second-period expected pro…ts. If monitoringtakesplace, the largeshareholder’s
expected pro…t is:
E(¦js = …;M > 0) ´ ﬁ…+
ﬁ…f[Pr(I = Hjs = …)+ Pr(I = Ljs = …)Pr(R = H)]M +Pr(I = Hjs = …)(1¡ M)g+
ﬁ…fPr(I = Ljs = …)Pr(R = L)M +Pr(I = Ljs = …)(1¡ M)g
¡ﬁC Pr(I = Ljs = …)M ¡ M2=2
30where the …rst term represents …rst-period pro…ts which are independent of
monitoring. The second and third terms represent second-period pro…ts: the
large shareholder obtains ﬁ… either when the incumbent manager is good or
when a bad manager is replaced by a good one; while she obtains ﬁ… when the
incumbent manager is bad and monitoring is not successful or when following
successful monitoring a bad manager is replaced by another bad CEO. The
fourth term represents expected …ring costswhilethelast term isthemonitoring
cost.
In the absence of monitoring, considering that the manager is never …red,
the large shareholder’s expected pro…ts are:
E(¦js = …;M = 0) ´ ﬁ… + ﬁ…Pr(I = Hjs = …)+ ﬁ…Pr(I = Ljs = …)
E(¦js = …;M > 0) is greater than E(¦js = …;M = 0) if Pr(I = Ljs =
…)ﬁ[(… ¡…)‚¡ C)] > M=2 implyingthat monitoring is unpro…table after s = …
if C > b C = (… ¡…)‚:
Suppose now that project 1 has been chosen. In this case …rst period pro…ts
are zero independently of the manager and monitoring is aimed at increasing
second-period pro…ts. Without monitoring largeshareholder’s pro…ts are ﬁ…‚+
ﬁ…(1¡ ‚): With monitoring pro…ts instead become:
ﬁ…[M1(‚+ (1¡‚)‚ +(1¡M1)‚]+ﬁ…[M1(1¡‚)(1¡‚)+ (1¡ M1)(1¡ ‚)]¡M2
1=2¡ﬁCM1(1¡‚)
Itiseasy to seethatthethreshold levelthat makesnomonitoring theoptimal
choice is given by: b C = (… ¡ …)‚: Then if C > b C; as we assume in the model,
monitoring is unpro…table both after a good signal and also after project 1 is
selected.
10 Appendix B
Proof of the Proposition. That expected pro…ts are higher under the dual board
structure follows immediately from (11); (12) and Lemma 2.
31To prove the part on expected gains note that b B is the value of B; that
equates (13) to (14): De…ne:
XH ´ p…;
XL ´ [q + (1¡ q)￿]…;
Since the part of expected gains that accrues in period 2; ﬁ…Pr(M = Hjt =
2) + ﬁ…Pr(M = Ljt = 2), is the same in both (11); (12) we compare only


































The proof is divided in two parts according to – being equal to 0 or positive.














We know from Lemma 1 that "S = 0 when B = 0 and that it is increasing
in B, but never reaches 1: When "S = 0; ei
S = ei
S = Zi: As "S approaches 1 for
B ! 1, ei
S asymptotically tends to 0.
Given that"¤
S < 1;(17) holds. NotethatE(G1
S) = ﬁXeS = ﬁ[XH‚ZH + XL (1¡‚)ZL]
when B = 0; while E(G1
S) = 1=2¡ x with x arbitrarily small when B ! 1:





















2 f¡ﬁ[XH‚ZH +XL (1¡ ‚)ZL]+ "Sg
Hence:




@B is negative independently of
the value of B, implying that E(G1
S) is continuously decreasing from
ﬁ[XH‚ZH +XL (1¡ ‚)ZL] for B = 0 to 1=2¡x for B ! 1:




@B is negative for
"S < ﬁ[XH‚ZH + XL(1¡‚)ZL] and positive for higher values of "S; implying
thatE(G1
S) is…rstcontinuouslydecreasing(startingfrom ﬁ[XH‚ZH +XL (1¡ ‚)ZL]
for B = 0) and then continuously increasing up to 1=2¡ x for B ! 1 (as "S
approaches 1).
As aconsequence,E(G1
S)is maximized forB = 0if ﬁ[XH‚ZH +XL (1¡ ‚)ZL] ¸
1 and for B ! 1 otherwise.
We know that for B = 0 E(G1
D) > E(G1
S)0: Hence b B exists only when
E(G1
D) < 1=2 and E(G1
S) is maximized for B ! 1.
Part 2: – > 0: This implies ¢i;Fi > 0; i = H;L:
Recalling that it always is ei¤
D > ei¤
S ; when ei¤

















Again we want to show that E(G1
S) is …rst continuously decreasing and then
continuously increasing in B; implying that the threshold level b B > 0 exists.









2 = ﬁ[XH‚(¢H ¡ FH)+ XL (1¡ ‚)(¢L ¡ FL)]+
331
2 for B = B:
(i) Consider …rst the case of B ¸ B implying "¤
S = 1 and ei
S = ei
S i = H;L











which is clearly continuously increasing in B; from E(G1
S)B for B = B =
1=(¢¡ F) to 1:
(ii) Consider then the case of B < B and "¤
S < 1.




















(1+BZ)2 [ﬁ[XH‚ZH + XL (1¡‚)ZL] +"s]




@B is always negative for B < B,
implying that E(G1
S) is continously decreasing from E(G1
S)0 to E(G1
S)B:




@B isnegativefor"s < ﬁ[XH‚ZH +XL (1¡ ‚)ZL]
and positive for "s > ﬁ[XH‚ZH +XL (1¡ ‚)ZL]; implying that E(G1
S) is …rst
continously decreasing and then increasing.
Taking into account both case (i) and case (ii), we can conclude that E(G1
S)
is …rst monotonically decreasing and then monotonically increasing for B that
goes from 0 to 1: Since E(G1
S)0 < E(G1
D); a value b B > 0 exists such that
E(G1
S)b B = E(G1
D) .
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